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LETTER DATED 12 DECEMBER 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the statement of 1 November 1996 (S/PRST/1996/44) in which the President of the Security Council, inter alia, recorded the Security Council's full support for my initiative in sending Mr. Raymond Chrétien as my Special Envoy to the Great Lakes region.

My Special Envoy has today delivered his report to me. I have pleasure in enclosing a copy and requesting you to make it available to the members of the Security Council.

I am giving urgent consideration to the assessment and recommendations which the report contains. I will convey my own views to the Security Council as soon as possible.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI



Annex

Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
to the Great Lakes region

(5 November-4 December 1996)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. When I left Washington on 5 November as your Special Envoy to the Great Lakes region, a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented proportion was unfolding in eastern Zaire. Intense fighting between Zairian troops and rebels had caused the evacuation of all international humanitarian workers and forced hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced Zairians to flee amidst alarming accounts of intimidation and killings and accusations by Zaire that Rwanda, with the help of Uganda, was waging a war on its territory. There was also pressure for immediate action from the media, the humanitarian community and the public at large. It was under these circumstances and in response to the grave concerns that you had expressed about the situation, that the Security Council, in its presidential statement of 1 November (S/PRST/1996/44), expressed its full support for your initiative to dispatch me to the Great Lakes region as your Special Envoy in order to establish the facts relating to the present conflict, to develop as a matter of urgency a plan to defuse tension and establish a ceasefire, to promote a process of negotiation and to submit advice on the mandate to be given to a United Nations Special Representative, including on the size and structure of a United Nations political presence, which, in consultation with the Governments and parties concerned, would be established in the Great Lakes region. The statement also called on you to ask me to promote the convening and encourage the adequate preparation of a conference on peace, security and development in the Great Lakes region.

2. It is important to note at the outset that in implementing the above mandate, account had to be taken of fast-moving developments in the subregion and elsewhere. Since I began my mission, important events have taken place that have helped ease some of the tension in the Great Lakes region in general and in eastern Zaire in particular.

3. The first such event was the declaration, on 4 November, by the rebel forces in eastern Zaire, of a unilateral ceasefire for a three-week period. The second was the constructive and timely statement adopted at Nairobi by the regional summit on 5 November, which, inter alia, reaffirmed the territorial integrity of Zaire and called for the cessation of hostilities as well as the deployment of a neutral force in the region. The third was the meeting I had with President Mobutu Sese Seko in Nice on 6 November. His live image on television and the subsequent account I gave to the press of the main points discussed in that meeting had a calming effect on the Zairian population, which had not seen pictures of the President since his operation. The fourth was the decision by the Security Council in its resolution 1080 (1996) to authorize the deployment of a multinational force in the region, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, for humanitarian purposes. The fifth, and

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perhaps most dramatic, event was the sudden and massive return of refugees, beginning 15 November, from north Kivu into Rwanda.

4. In the light of the above, I emphasized the following objectives within my mandate:

(a) To consolidate the ceasefire and ensure its continuation beyond the declared three-week period;

(b) To provide guidance to the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in his efforts to negotiate with the parties to the conflict the channelling of urgent humanitarian assistance to the refugees and internally displaced Zairians;

(c) To facilitate the decision-making process among the countries in the region regarding the deployment of the multinational force and to develop a common understanding of its mandate and composition;

(d) To promote a political dialogue between Zaire and Rwanda;

(e) To determine the readiness of the countries in the region to participate in an international conference on peace, security and development in the region;

(f) To seek the views of the regional leaders, including the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), on the nature and mandate of a future United Nations political presence in the Great Lakes region.

5. Because of the immediate political and humanitarian crisis that was unfolding in eastern Zaire, my team and I had to devote most of our time and energy to pursuing the first five objectives, which necessitated constant shuttling, in particular, between Kigali and Kinshasa.

6. The first part of this report provides an account of the views of the leaders of the region on the crisis in eastern Zaire, on the deployment of the multinational force and on other aspects of my mandate, including the prospects for the early convening of an international conference. The second part provides a brief analysis of the current political situation as it pertains to my mandate. The last part offers some recommendations and observations on the mandate of a United Nations Special Representative for the Great Lakes region. The composition of my team and an annotated schedule of my activities in the region are appended to the present report.

II. THE VIEWS OF THE REGIONAL LEADERS

The views of the Government of Zaire

7. During my first meeting with him, in France, President Mobutu Sese Seko assured me that his country, which he believed was the victim of aggression, would do everything in its power to maintain the ceasefire. He expressed his full support for the statement adopted at the regional summit in Nairobi on

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5 November. He welcomed any humanitarian assistance that would result in the early return of the refugees and would not put into question the territorial integrity of Zaire. In Kinshasa, I had a frank and constructive dialogue during my various meetings with Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo and other Government officials, including the Foreign Minister, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Defence and the two Vice-Presidents of the Transitional Parliament. Despite the prevailing feeling of being the victim of its own hospitality, the Zairian Government reaffirmed the assurances given to me by President Mobutu and declared its readiness to be as flexible as possible in order to enable urgent humanitarian assistance to reach refugees and internally displaced persons. This flexibility became increasingly evident in subsequent meetings with these officials. They welcomed the early deployment of the multinational force, which they believed would lower tension in the region. They were of the view that, however urgent and noble the humanitarian mandate of this force, its action would not be effective in the absence of peace and security in the region. They stressed that the problem posed by the Banyamulenge rebels was an internal problem that Zaire would settle on its own. In their opinion, the former Rwandese Armed Forces (ex-FAR), the Interahamwe and their political leadership should be separated from the refugees, and a solution should be found for those among them who did not wish to return voluntarily to Rwanda.

8. The idea of an international conference was not received with much enthusiasm. It was argued that sufficient time should be given to the multinational force to do its work before contemplating such a major event. Some officials, however, expressed interest in reviving the Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes Region (CEPGL). They did not rule out an informal, low-key political dialogue as one way of preparing for such a conference. In subsequent meetings, Prime Minister Kengo stated that he would consider meeting with the Rwandan leadership either bilaterally or under the auspices of a regional leader. As conditions for such a meeting, he mentioned the formal cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of foreign troops from eastern Zaire. I expressed doubts as to whether these conditions would be conducive to a meaningful dialogue. In my last meeting with him he showed some flexibility and did not insist on those preconditions.

9. When I met with President Mobutu for the second time, at the conclusion of my mission, we reviewed the latest developments since my previous meeting with him, in particular the massive return of refugees to Rwanda from eastern Zaire and the scaling down of the size of the multinational force, as well as the disquieting surge of fighting on the border between Zaire and Uganda. On the question of the regional conference, the President was of the view that the prospects of such a conference had improved and that a "Nairobi II" could be the appropriate forum, as well as a stepping stone to an international conference. Zaire, he affirmed, would attend this time. He also said that Major Buyoya should not be excluded from such a gathering, notwithstanding the sanctions imposed on Burundi. He reaffirmed his intention to return to Zaire as soon as his medical condition permitted.

The views of the Government of Rwanda

10. President Pasteur Bizimungu and Vice-President Paul Kagame told me that Rwanda did not consider itself to be at war with Zaire. Zaire, they stressed, was at war with itself. They expressed their commitment to do everything in their power to ensure that the ceasefire by the rebels was maintained. They reaffirmed their strong desire to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of their nationals from Zaire and, to that end, promised to take concrete steps in the very near future. The leaders welcomed the deployment of a neutral force, provided its objectives remained exclusively humanitarian and the troops that comprised it came from countries that had no hidden political agenda in the region. They advised that the international community should not overestimate the strength or fighting stamina of the ex-FAR and their allies. They also expressed readiness to renew the dialogue with Zaire in order to reduce tension, but stressed that no preconditions should be set for this dialogue. As regards the international conference, they were of the view that there were enough regional and subregional forums, such as the 5 November Nairobi summit, where issues of common concern could be discussed.

11. The unexpected massive flow of refugees back into Rwanda from eastern Zaire caused Rwanda to question publicly the rationale for the multinational force. During the last meeting I had with him, President Bizimungu said that, while he welcomed the return of Rwandese refugees, Zairians of Tutsi origin who had been pushed out of eastern Zaire should return to their country.

12. During my conversations with Zairian and Rwandan officials, the United Nations and some of its agencies were criticized. Rwanda argued that what it needed was rehabilitation, reconstruction and humanitarian assistance for the returnees rather than a multinational force. President Mobutu, on the other hand, felt that the presence of a force or a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the region would have a salutary effect. As for the headquarters of such a Representative, Nairobi was mentioned as a possibility.

The views of the Government of Uganda

13. President Yoweri Museveni was very concerned about the humanitarian and economic impact the situation in eastern Zaire was already having on his own country. He offered his good offices to help ease the tension between Rwanda and Zaire, if both countries so wished. I welcomed, in this regard, his offer to make it possible for the Rwandan and Zairian delegations to meet informally in Rome in the margins of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) summit. I subsequently learned that commendable efforts were made, but the meeting between the two, regrettably, did not take place. Zaire and Rwanda gave me conflicting reasons as to why it did not materialize.

14. In the course of subsequent telephone conversations, both Prime Minister Kengo and President Bizimungu indicated to me that they would be willing to consider a bilateral meeting under the auspices of President Mandela, if it could be arranged. I undertook to discuss this possibility with the South African leader during my meeting with him (see para. 21 below).

The views of the Government of Burundi

15. Major Buyoya said that the multinational force was welcome. He indicated that the force could use Bujumbura airport, provided his own national airlines, notwithstanding the sanctions, were allowed to fly. He described forcefully the hardships suffered by Burundi as a result of the "blockade" imposed by the neighbouring countries. He divided the latter into two groups: those who were hostile to Burundi and those who were not.

The views of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania

16. Echoing earlier criticism by Ethiopia and Kenya, President Benjamin Mkapa regretted the perceived lack of consultations in the Security Council with African States regarding the mandate and composition of the multinational force. He was satisfied with my explanation that these consultations did indeed take place and that Lieutenant General Maurice Baril, the Force Commander, had from the outset intended to include African troops and Africans in the command structure, were the force to be deployed. He welcomed the massive return of refugees to Rwanda from eastern Zaire and said that he would not send back those present in the United Republic of Tanzania without prior consultations with the Rwandan authorities.

17. Burundi was the subject of a lengthy discussion, which I also shared with Mr. Faguy. In President Mkapa's view, the problem of Burundi was the absence of a legitimate authority that could speak for the country. On the question of an international conference, he was of the view that the time was not ripe for it. He favoured a gradual approach whereby internal problems were addressed separately, while issues of common concern were discussed in regional forums. Confidence-building measures, economic cooperation and illicit traffic in small arms were mentioned as examples of issues that required a regional approach.

The views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity

18. The mandate and the composition of the multinational force, as well as the modalities of the contribution of African countries to that force, took the lion's share of my meeting with Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim. On the question of a political dialogue between Zaire and Rwanda, Mr. Salim encouraged me to explore further such an avenue despite my unsuccessful attempts. He welcomed the idea of involving President Mandela as facilitator of a possible meeting between Prime Minister Kengo and President Bizimungu. Regarding the internal situation in Zaire, we shared the view that President Mobutu was a vital player and should, therefore, be encouraged to return to Zaire as soon as possible. Secretary-General Salim also believed that President Mobutu could play a pivotal role as a "healer" and "reconciliator" on the issue of the Banyamulenge and other Zairians of Tutsi origin whose citizenship had been revoked.

19. On the convening of an international conference, Mr. Salim stated that such a conference should be the ultimate step crowning a series of well-prepared regional meetings such as the recent Nairobi summit. He stated that the time of a Nairobi II summit had come and that he was confident President Moi would be agreeable to chairing it, but he added that, for this second summit to be

successful, Zaire must agree to participate and Major Buyoya should be invited. At the end of the meeting, Mr. Salim expressed his support for the early appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General residing in the region. Regardless of the location of his/her office, Mr. Salim was of the view that the Special Representative must have at his/her disposal all the administrative and logistic means that would enable him/her to travel freely throughout the region.

The views of the Government of Ethiopia

20. Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was of the view that if Rwanda and Zaire were left alone there would be no war. A dialogue between the two must be pursued. He would not rule out a meeting between Presidents Mobutu and Bizimungu in the near future in a neutral place in Europe. In the meantime, the countries concerned, particularly Zaire and Burundi, should be assisted in resolving their serious internal problems. President Mobutu's role in that regard was vital.

The views of the Government of South Africa

21. President Nelson Mandela was of the opinion that the matter of an international conference should best be left to the regional leaders to decide. Although it could be a costly exercise, an international conference would benefit from the added objectivity provided by the presence of international participants. As far as a Nairobi II summit was concerned, President Mandela was interested to hear about the active discussions taking place on this subject among the regional leaders. In his view, Major Buyoya should not be excluded from such a summit. As regards his role as the facilitator of a meeting between President Bizimungu and Prime Minister Kengo, President Mandela indicated that he would be willing to host such a meeting if the leaders of the subregion, as well as the countries of the Southern African Development Community, wanted him to do so. A constructive discussion of the multinational force followed, during which the President expressed his country's readiness to contribute to the force.

The views of the Government of Kenya

22. Despite repeated attempts, I was not able to meet with President Daniel Arap Moi. His busy schedule and my own unpredictable travel plans precluded such a meeting. Through my conversation with the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was able, however, to ascertain that the idea of a Nairobi II summit had been discussed with President Moi in the margins of the summit meeting of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, held in Djibouti on 24 November. She also informed me that if the question of the participation of Zaire and Burundi (which were both absent from the last Nairobi meeting) could be resolved, a Nairobi II summit could take place some time in December.

The views of the Government of Cameroon

23. President Paul Biya expressed his disappointment at the scaling down of the multinational force. Its presence in eastern Zaire would have had a calming effect on the volatile situation there. He was encouraged by the prospect of a

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Nairobi II summit, provided it was well prepared and attended by both Burundi and Zaire. The latter should be discouraged from playing the "empty chair" in regional forums. As far as Major Buyoya's attendance was concerned, it should not be viewed as a weakening of sanctions. Dialogue and sanctions were not mutually exclusive. President Biya also said that an international participation at a Nairobi II summit would be a good strategy. As regards the presence of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the region, President Biya opined that his role might be overshadowed by the presence of the multinational force. He nonetheless admitted that a United Nations presence was needed in order to encourage a political dialogue. On a temporary basis, a high-level Secretariat official could easily perform such a function until a more permanent arrangement was found.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION AS IT PERTAINS TO THE MANDATE OF THE SPECIAL ENVOY

The multinational force

24. It is evident that with the return to Rwanda of approximately 600,000 refugees, the need for the deployment of a multinational force, as envisaged in Security Council resolution 1080 (1996) has changed.

The ceasefire

25. Although the ceasefire has held for a while in most of the Kivu provinces, the continued advance by rebel forces northward and westward continues to be a major source of concern in the subregion. Zaire has once again declared its readiness to use all the means at its disposal to regain control over its territory. The fighting between Zairian and Ugandan troops on 30 November also does not bode well for peace and stability in the region.

Political dialogue

26. It is clear from my conversations with the leaders of the subregion that the desire for a political dialogue, in particular between Zaire and Rwanda, still exists. I am inclined to believe that the seeds I have sown for such a dialogue will bear fruit in the weeks to come. Many observers present at the recent Extraordinary Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Central African States, held at Brazzaville on 2 and 3 December, believe a rapprochement between Zaire and Rwanda would have occurred had Rwanda responded positively to the invitation of President Pascal Lissouba of the Congo. In this regard, it is important to note that Major Buyoya's participation in the summit seems to have not only lifted, at least temporarily, his diplomatic isolation, but also paved the way for a significant improvement in relations between Zaire and Burundi.

International conference on peace and security versus a regional summit

27. As can be seen from the accounts of the discussions I had with the leaders of the region, there is little enthusiasm for an international conference at this stage. It is no accident that there was no mention of such a conference in the 5 November declaration of the Nairobi summit. There is, however, a growing realization that the crises in Kivu and in Burundi cannot be considered merely internal matters nor dissociated from other serious problems that afflict the Great Lakes region. A consensus seems to be developing for the convening of a regional summit similar to the one held at Nairobi in early November. A number of factors favour, in my view, the convening of a Nairobi II summit at this time:

(a) President Mobutu has indicated to me that Zaire would attend such a summit;

(b) Major Buyoya would, in all likelihood, be invited;

(c) As mentioned earlier, there was a rapprochement between Zaire and Burundi during the Brazzaville summit. It is hoped by the proponents of a regional summit that a similar rapprochement can take place between Zaire and Rwanda.

IV. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
FOR THE GREAT LAKES REGION

28. From the feedback I have received, it would seem that the short but intense mission I had the privilege to lead has made some difference. The mission has faithfully documented the views, aspirations and concerns of the leaders inside and outside the region and communicated them to all concerned either publicly or privately. It has helped the decision makers of the troop-contributing and other countries of the region make informed choices about the composition and mandate of the multinational force, as well as the timing of its deployment. The intense shuttling between Kigali and Kinshasa and my pronouncements about a political dialogue have contributed, in my view, to calming the situation during the tense first two weeks of my mission.

29. As explained above, while the immediate humanitarian crisis may have eased somewhat, the underlying political and military causes of instability in the region have yet to be addressed. The reported flight of over 20,000 refugees away from the border between the United Republic of Tanzania and Rwanda and deeper inland may jeopardize the voluntary repatriation of the estimated 500,000 Rwandan refugees from Tanzania. The stabilizing effects expected from the massive presence of a multinational force are now in doubt in light of the developments on the ground and the drastic scaling down of this force. As I left the region, attention was already shifting from the humanitarian crisis to the political situation in Zaire and its potentially turbulent effects on an already fragile and volatile region; hence the repeated calls by all the African leaders for the absolute need to safeguard the territorial integrity of Zaire.

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30. It is largely for the above reasons that the leaders whose views I solicited believed that the appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General would have a salutary effect.

31. The mandate of such a representative, the structure and location of his office and the profile of the team that should work with him/her are outlined below.

The mandate

32. As I see it now, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General would need to perform the following tasks:

(a) Facilitate political dialogue and reconciliation, both at the bilateral and regional levels, and provide good offices and mediation services upon request;

(b) Assist regional leaders in the development of a common strategy for promoting dialogue and stability in the region across cultural and linguistic divides;

(c) Support all efforts aimed at promoting reconciliation in Zaire;

(d) Maintain a working relationship with all the regional leaders, the Secretary-General of OAU, President Nyerere, the Special Representatives of Canada, the European Union, and the United States, among others, as well as your Special Representative for Burundi;

(e) Provide guidance to the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator and guidance, as needed, to the Force Commander of whatever international military force may be present in the region;

(f) Promote and guide efforts aimed at the convening of an international conference for peace, security and development and participate actively in such a conference;

(g) Insofar as durable peace and security depend on the establishment and consolidation of democratic processes and participatory systems of governance, encourage national efforts aimed at developing such processes and systems.

Alternative arrangements

33. Three alternative arrangements can be envisaged for the performance of the above tasks by the Special Representative and his staff:

(a) To appoint a Special Representative who would reside in Nairobi or another appropriate location not too distant from the countries of the subregion;

(b) To appoint a roving Special Representative with no fixed home base for several months until he/she and his/her staff have developed a working

relationship with the regional leaders and earned the trust of the parties directly or indirectly involved;

(c) To appoint a Special Representative (possibly a high-level Secretariat official) who would visit the region when and as needed.

34. In order for any of the above options to be viable, the Special Representative must be provided with the necessary administrative and logistical means (including satellite communications and a small aircraft) to enable him/her to travel freely throughout the region.

35. Had the multinational force established itself in the region, including eastern Zaire, with the original strength envisaged, I would have been inclined to recommend to you option (c), at least until 31 March 1997, when the mandate of the force expires. However, given that the force deployed is quite modest, options (a) and (b) commend themselves. The only drawback of option (b) is that shuttling between African capitals, particularly at times of crisis, would be a taxing proposition no matter how physically fit the Special Representative and his/her team are or how fully equipped and mobile the office may be. If, for compelling reasons, options (a) or (b) cannot be implemented immediately, I strongly suggest that you consider option (c), so as not to lose the goodwill and momentum generated by my short mission.

United Nations presence in Zaire and Rwanda

36. Although I see merit in establishing satellite offices in both Rwanda and Zaire, time and effort would be needed to persuade both countries to accept such offices. Zaire considers the turmoil in the Kivu region to be an internal problem and wants to deal with it on its own. Rwanda has its hands full with the massive return of refugees and has stressed that what it needs most is assistance with the economic and social reintegration of these refugees. This, however, should not preclude the establishment of such offices at a later stage, nor should it prevent, if developments warrant it, the strengthening of the United Nations electoral office in Kinshasa, which I understand has been providing valuable services to the National Electoral Commission.

The size and structure of the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General

37. In addition to the Special Representative, it is my considered opinion that the team should have at least the following staff:

(a) One senior political adviser at the director level (D-2) who would act as officer-in-charge in the absence of the Special Representative and would periodically be dispatched from the home base to one or more countries of the region on special assignment;

(b) A deputy to the political adviser at the D-1 level;

(c) Two political affairs officers, one of whom would also serve as spokesperson;

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- (d) Two liaison officers for humanitarian and human rights issues;
- (e) A logistics/communications officer;
- (f) An administrative officer;
- (g) A personal/administrative assistant to the Special Representative;
- (h) Two secretaries, two security officers and other support staff as needed.

38. The political staff must have excellent communication skills in English and French and should be familiar with the theory and practice of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking.

39. In addition to impeccable linguistic skills, the Special Representative should be a well-known and internationally respected figure with the intellectual capacity and diplomatic skills to help develop a consensus on the nature of and solutions for the problems that afflict the countries of the Great Lakes region.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

40. I wish to conclude this report by extending to the Secretary-General my sincere gratitude for entrusting me with this challenging assignment and for greatly facilitating my task by writing and speaking in advance to all the leaders of the region. My heartfelt thanks go to my own country, Canada, for its leadership at a critical time and for providing me with valuable logistical support. Last, but not least, I wish to thank the members of my team for their indefatigable support throughout this intense, but most rewarding, mission and to express my fervent hope that the population of the Great Lakes region of central Africa may find peace.

Appendix

Mission of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
to the Great Lakes region

Composition of the team

Mr. Raymond Chrétien	Ambassador of Canada to the United States of America Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region
Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello	United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for the Great Lakes Region
Mr. Youssef Mahmoud	Senior Political Adviser
Mr. Georges Rioux	Political Affairs Officer/Spokesperson
Mr. Michel N. Kassa	Political Affairs Officer
Ms. Angelica Malic	Administrative Assistant

Appendix II

[Original: French]

Mission of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General
to the Great Lakes region

Schedule

Tuesday, 5 November 1996

WASHINGTON, D.C.

7 a.m. Departure from Andrews Air Force Base

SANTA MARIA

12.05 p.m. Stopover

12.55 p.m. Departure

NICE

10.30 p.m. Arrival in Nice (Hotel Westminster-Concorde)

Wednesday, 6 November

Morning: Consultations with the Office of President Mobutu
4.30 p.m. Private meeting with President Mobutu at Villa del Mare
6 p.m. Press conference at Hotel Alexandra

Thursday, 7 November

8 a.m. Departure for Nairobi via Cairo

CAIRO

11.15 a.m. Stopover

12.20 p.m. Departure

NAIROBI

7.30 p.m. Arrival in Nairobi (Hotel Safari Club)

8.30 p.m. Meeting with Mr. Felix Masha, political adviser to
President/Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, Mediator for Burundi

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Friday, 8 November

10 a.m. Departure for Kigali

KIGALI

11 a.m. Arrival in Kigali: press conference at the airport
12.30 p.m. Meeting with the diplomatic corps at the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) office
2.15 p.m. Meeting at the Office of the President with President
Pasteur Bizimungu and Mr. Paul Kagamé, Vice-President and
Minister of Defence
3.30 p.m. Press conference with President Bizimungu at his Office
4 p.m. Press conference at the airport
4.30 p.m. Departure for Kinshasa

KINSHASA

6.30 p.m. Arrival in Kinshasa (Hotel Inter-Continental)

Saturday, 9 November

9 a.m. Meeting with Mr. Kititwa Tumansi, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Meeting with Grand Admiral Mavua Mudima, Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of Defence
1 p.m. Meeting with Mr. Kengo wa Dondo, Prime Minister
2 p.m. Meeting with Mr. Gerard Kamanda wa Kamanda, Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister of the Interior
6 p.m. Meeting with Mr. Tshisekedi
6.45 p.m. Meeting with Admiral Mudima and Deputy Prime Minister Kamanda on
the humanitarian assistance situation

[Adoption of the first Security Council resolution:
1078 (1996)]

Sunday, 10 November

9.50 a.m. Departure for Kampala

KAMPALA

3.30 p.m. Arrival in Entebbe
4 p.m. Meeting with President Yoweri Museveni
6.30 p.m. Departure for Kigali

KIGALI

8.30 p.m. Arrival in Kigali (Hotel Umubano)

Monday, 11 November

9.30 a.m. Meeting with the humanitarian mission of the European troika
headed by Ms. Emma Bonino
11.15 a.m. Second meeting with President Pasteur Bizimungu and
Mr. Paul Kagamé
12.30 p.m. Joint press conference with President Bizimungu
3.30 p.m. Telephone conversation with Prime Minister Kengo

[Ministerial meeting of the Central Organ of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management and Resolution]

Tuesday, 12 November

Noon Meeting with President Bizimungu
4.30 p.m. Departure from Kigali

KINSHASA

6 p.m. Arrival in Kinshasa (Hotel Inter-Continental)

Wednesday, 13 November

11 a.m. Second meeting with Mr. Kititwa Tumansi, Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister for Foreign Affairs
Noon Second meeting with Prime Minister Léon Kengo wa Dondo
12.45 p.m. Press briefing with Prime Minister Kengo
4.30 p.m. Talk with Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda, Minister of the Interior
7.30 p.m. Press conference at the Hotel Inter-Continental

Thursday, 14 November

10 a.m. Talk with Mr. Boboliko, Vice-President of the High Council of
the Republic and the Transitional Parliament (HCR/PT)
11 a.m. Talk with Mr. Bembé, Vice-President of HCR/PT
12.30 p.m. Meeting with the diplomatic corps of the European Union at the
UNDP office
2.30 p.m. Meeting with Mr. Nicod, Director of the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Zaire
6 p.m. Third meeting with Prime Minister Kengo

Friday, 15 November

10.45 a.m. Departure from Kinshasa

[Refugees begin to cross the Rwanda-Zaire border]

BUJUMBURA

Noon Arrival in Bujumbura (Hotel Novotel)
2 p.m. Meeting with Mr. Marc Faguy, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Burundi

5 p.m. Talk with Major Pierre Buyoya, President of Burundi, at his Office
6.45 p.m. Press briefing at the Office of the President
7.30 p.m. Dinner given by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
Guests: the Director-General for Europe and North America and international organizations, the Diplomatic Counsellor to the President, and the Chief of Protocol

10.30 p.m. Telephone conversations with New York to discuss the Security Council resolution that Rwanda is seeking to block because refugees began to cross the border on Friday morning

[Adoption of Security Council resolution 1080 (1996) authorizing the deployment of a multinational force]

Saturday, 16 November

9 a.m. Breakfast/meeting at the residence of the dean of the diplomatic corps, the Ambassador of Egypt, with the diplomatic corps in Bujumbura
10.30 a.m. Departure for Kigali

KIGALI

11.40 a.m. Arrival in Kigali (Hotel Umubano)
8.30-10 p.m. Meeting with President Bizimungu (at Hotel Umubano)
10.30 p.m. Telephone conversation with Lieutenant-General Maurice Baril

Sunday, 17 November

9 a.m. Telephone conversation with President Julius Nyerere
10 a.m. Telephone conversation with President Pierre Buyoya
Staff meetings

Monday, 18 November

Noon Departure for Dar-es-Salaam

DAR-ES-SALAAM

2 p.m. Arrival in Dar-es-Salaam
3 p.m. Briefing at UNDP office
4 p.m. Meeting with President Benjamin Mpaka
5 p.m. Press briefing at the Office of the President
7 p.m. Departure from Dar-es-Salaam

KIGALI

8 p.m. Return to Kigali

Tuesday, 19 November

8.30 a.m. Pick up General Baril at the airport
Three-hour meeting with the Lieutenant-General at the Canadian
Consul's residence
3 p.m. Debriefing by General Baril on his meeting with Vice-President
and Minister of Defence Paul Kagamé
3.45 p.m. Press conference at the airport
4 p.m. Departure from Kigali

KINSHASA

6.30 p.m. Arrival in Kinshasa

Wednesday, 20 November

2-7 p.m. Series of meetings with the Ministers of Defence, Interior and
Foreign Affairs
7 p.m. Meeting with Prime Minister Kengo and Lieutenant-General Baril
at the Prime Minister's residence
8 p.m. Departure of the Lieutenant-General for Entebbe

[Replacement of General Eluki, Chief of the General Staff of the
Zairian armed forces]

Thursday, 21 November

1.30 p.m. Meeting with the Norwegian envoy, Ambassador Toraasen
2-3.30 p.m. Meeting with members of Parliament from South Kivu
3.30-5 p.m. Meeting with members of Parliament from North Kivu

[Tshisekedi meets with President Mobutu in Nice]

Friday, 22 November

9 a.m. Private meeting with Prime Minister Kengo
9.45 a.m. Press briefing at the Office of the Prime Minister

[Tshisekedi proclaims himself Prime Minister on Radio France
International, a senior staff member in President Mobutu's
Office denies the report]

11 a.m. Departure from Kinshasa

ADDIS ABABA

5 p.m. Arrival in Addis Ababa (Hilton Hotel)
6.15-8.15 p.m. Meeting with Mr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Secretary-General of the
Organization of African Unity

Saturday, 23 November

3 p.m. Meeting with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi

Sunday, 24 November

6 p.m. Dinner with the diplomatic corps at the residence of the
regional representative of UNHCR, Mr. David Lambo

Monday, 25 November

Private talks with OAU and Ethiopian Government officials

Tuesday, 26 November

10 a.m. Telephone conversation with President Bizimungu
11.30 a.m. Departure for Nairobi

NAIROBI

4 p.m. Arrival in Nairobi (Grand Regency Hotel)
5.30-7.30 p.m. Reception with the diplomatic corps (17 ambassadors) at the
residence of the High Commissioner of Canada,
Mr. Bernard Dussault

Wednesday, 27 November

Noon Departure for Pretoria

PRETORIA

6 p.m. Arrival in Pretoria (Kloof House)

Thursday, 28 November

12.30 p.m. Luncheon hosted by the High Commissioner of Canada,
Mr. Arthur Perron
7 p.m. Dinner hosted by High Commissioner Perron attended by the
diplomatic corps (8) at his residence in Johannesburg

Friday, 29 November

9 a.m. Meeting with President Nelson Mandela
11 a.m. Meeting with Mr. Honoré Ngbanda, Special Adviser to
President Mobutu, at the office of the High Commissioner of
Canada
12.15 p.m. Working lunch hosted by the Director-General of Foreign Affairs
with the South African Government Task Force for the Great
Lakes region, at the home of the Minister
3 p.m. Meeting with Mr. Thabo Mbeki, Vice-President of South Africa, at
the Union Building
4 p.m. Joint press conference with Mr. Mbeki

Saturday, 30 November

10 a.m. Departure from Johannesburg

ENTEBBE

1.30 p.m. Stopover
Visit to multinational force headquarters
2.30 p.m. Departure for Yaoundé

YAOUNDE

5 p.m. Arrival in Yaoundé (Hotel Mont Fébé)
7 p.m. Reception at the residence of the High Commissioner of Canada in
Cameroon, Mr. Pierre Giguère

Sunday, 1 December

11 a.m. Private meeting with President Paul Biya
12.50 p.m. Press briefing at the Office of the President
1.50 p.m. Departure from Yaoundé

DAKAR

6 p.m. Arrival in Dakar (Hotel President-Meridien)

Monday, 2 December

10 a.m. Meeting with President Abdou Diouf
Noon Press briefing at the official residence of the High
Commissioner of Canada
2.30 p.m. Departure for Nice

NICE

8 p.m. Arrival in Nice (Hotel Alexandra)

Tuesday, 3 December

Telephone consultations and preparations for the 4 December meeting

Wednesday, 4 December

11.30 a.m. Meeting with President Mobutu at his residence in Cap Martin-Villa del Mare
2.30 p.m. Press conference at the Hotel Alexandra in Cap Martin

Thursday, 5 December

10 a.m. Departure from Nice
WASHINGTON, D.C.
3 p.m. Arrival at Andrews Air Force Base

Wednesday, 11 December

NEW YORK

5 p.m. Meeting with the Secretary-General of the United Nations to submit report

Thursday, 12 December

3.30 p.m. Security Council briefing
